The Modern American
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 3

2013

A Thought Experiment: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas
Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown University Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, Law and Race
Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Seidman, Louis Michael (2013) "A Thought Experiment: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,"
The Modern American: Vol. 9 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol9/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Modern American by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

A Thought Experiment: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas

This article is available in The Modern American: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol9/iss3/3

A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
By: Louis Michael Seidman

Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, Kansas

Mr. Justice Scalia, dissenting.
The Court's somber and sonorous tones
suggest that it imagines itself writing for the ages. In
fact, something a good deal less portentous and more
sordid is going on. The Justices of this Court have
decided to sign on as a branch office of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
I do not for a moment denigrate the aims
of that organization. It has a right, like any other
organization, to pursue its goals. This is, after all,
America, and Americans have the right to file even
frivolous law suits. But before today, I would not
have thought that this Court has a right to foist its
own trendy vision of our future on the rest of us.
The American people may some day decide that a
program of racial mongrelization is for them. So far
as I can see, they have not decided this yet, and it is
not for the Justices of this Court, isolated in their allwhite enclaves, to decide it for them.
The Court is so preoccupied with rhetoric
that it barely bothers to justify its conclusions. Where
is the warrant for its sweeping declaration that separate
is inherently unequal? In the Constitution's text?
The fourteenth amendment says not a word about
integrated schooling. In the intent of the framers?
The Court itself concedes, as it must, that the framers
intended no such thing. In our prior precedent? We
have upheld the constitutionality of separate but
equal facilities for half a century. In the traditions of
the American people? Whether the majority of this
Court likes it or not, we have a long and honored
history of the separate development of the races.
No, the Court claims no support for its
extraordinary holding in any of the usual sources of
constitutional law. Indeed, the Court is so ashamed of
the true support for its ruling that it has buried it in
an obscure footnote. It would have us believe that it is
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justified in dismantling generations of social practice,
upon which an entire society has been built, because
of the color of some dolls that a few children have
picked in a so-called experiment organized specifically
for the purpose of winning this law suit.
Constitutional law has never known a
principle such as this. I confess that I have no idea why
children pick some dolls to play with rather than others.
But suppose it is true that these particular children
chose these particular dolls because their self-esteem
is not quite what the Justices of this Court would like
it to be. How can we possibly know the sources of
their unhappiness? Does the Constitution, perhaps,
guarantee them a free session of psychotherapy at the
expense of the American taxpayers? For all we know,
a different group of children, living in a different
location, might pick different dolls. Is segregation
then to be unconstitutional in some jurisdictions and
constitutionally mandated in others?
But suppose that we pass all this and somehow
assume that the fact that some students pick some
dolls rather than others in fact demonstrates that
segregated education affects the "hearts and minds"
(not the liver and spleen?) of colored children. The
Court claims that principles of equality require that
the system should therefore be dismantled. This is a
very odd equality indeed. Apparently, equality means
that our educational system must be turned upside
down so as to maximize the achievement of one group
of students. The Court cares not a whit, so far as its
opinion reveals, about the hearts and minds (or other
bodily organs either) of other students, much less
their parents. For all we know, white achievement will
decline in the new, radically different environment
that the Court is determined to foist upon us. This
is not equal rights. It is a racial entitlement - special
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rights for the colored - rights that the proud men who
wrote the Constitution surely never meant to provide.
Try as I might, I cannot take seriously an
argument that the "separate is inherently unequal"
equation is based upon constitutional text or even on
social science. I fear that the Court's new algebra has
another source entirely. In its heart (but surely not in
its mind), the Court is so enamored of its own power
that it believes that it can make this statement true
simply by saying that it is true.
The Court claims today that its decision is
about education. Do not believe it. The agenda of
the NAACP is hardly limited to this sphere, and the
"logic" of this Court extends far beyond this field. We
can expect in the years to come the forced integration
of our restaurants, our neighborhoods, and our
churches. No one should be fooled. Interracial
marriage is next on the Court's hit list.
There is a judicial arrogance in pursuit of
this agenda - an arrogance ultimately grounded in
ignorance and intolerance. The Court demonstrates
no awareness of or concern about the great culture
that it is attacking. No one claims that this culture
is without fault - no culture is. But the land that
Jefferson, Madison, and Calhoun loved that
Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis staked their careers
and lives to defend - was also a noble and gallant
place. No, it is not the land that many of the Justices
of this Court happen to live in, and they, apparently,
will not mourn its destruction. Perhaps it was fated
to fade away in any event. But if fade away it must,
I would have hoped that it would do so in its own
time and on its own terms. The country will come to
regret the unceremonious shove toward oblivion that
the Court administers today.
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